Ideally a just constitution would be a just procedure arranged to insure a just outcome.

Clearly when the liberties are left unrestricted they collide with one another.

We must choose for others as we have reason to believe they would choose for themselves if they were at the age of reason and deciding rationally.

The suppression of liberty is always likely to be irrational.

Let us now consider whether justice requires the toleration of the intolerant, and if so under what conditions. There are a variety of situations in which this question arises. Some political parties in democratic states hold doctrines that commit them to suppress the constitutional liberties whenever they have the power. Again, there are those who reject intellectual freedom but who nevertheless hold positions in the university. It may appear that toleration in these cases is inconsistent with the principles of justice, or at any rate not required by them.

An intolerant sect has no right to complain when it is denied an equal liberty. … A person’s right to complain is limited to principles he acknowledges himself.

Justice does not require that men must stand idly by while others destroy the basis of their existence.

Essentially the fault lies in the fact that the democratic political process is at best regulated rivalry; it does not even in theory have the desirable properties that price theory ascribes to truly competitive markets.

The fundamental criterion for judging any procedure is the justice of its likely results.

Properly understood, then, the desire to act justly derives in part from the desire to express most fully what we are or can be, namely free and equal rational beings with the liberty to choose.

A just system must generate its own support.

Rawls's work, for better or worse, is not inspired by this kind of epic ambition. His very modesty and lack of speculative curiosity are what exclude him from the ranks of the great philosophers. Rawls is not an Isaiah Berlin with his anguished sense of the conflict of goods which besets human life; nor is he a Leo Strauss with his vivid awareness of the forces of persecution with which philosophy has always to contend; nor is he a Michael Oakeshott with his diagnosis of the dangers posed by excessive rationalism to the goals of a free society. Rawls is a philosopher for our time. His desire is to render both theoretically and practically legitimate the redistributivist policies of the prosperous North Atlantic welfare states. There is already more than a whiff of nostalgia about this project. This is by no means a contemptible goal, but it is well to remember that this project of rationalization is one — but only one — way in which philosophy can be practiced.

I am particularly grateful to Nozick for his unfailing help and encouragement during the last stages.

This is a long book, not only in pages.

Justice is happiness according to virtue.

In justice as fairness society is interpreted as a cooperative venture for mutual advantage.

A scheme is unjust when the higher expectations, one or more of them, are excessive. If these expectations were decreased, the situation of the less favored would be improved.

The even larger difference between rich and poor makes the latter even worse off, and this violates the principle of mutual advantage.

In justice as fairness society is interpreted as a cooperative venture for mutual advantage.

Greater intelligence, wealth and opportunity, for example, allow a person to achieve ends he could not rationally contemplate otherwise.

The difference principle, for example, requires that the higher expectations of the more advantaged contribute to the prospects of the least advantaged.

No one deserves his greater natural capacity nor merits a more favorable starting place in society.

If A were not allowed his better position, B would be even worse off than he is.

First of all, no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status; nor does he know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence and strength, and the like. Nor, again, does anyone know his conception of the good, the particulars of his rational plan of life, or even the special features of psychology such as his aversion to risk or liability to optimism or pessimism. More than this, I assume that the parties do not know the particular circumstances of their own society. That is, they do not know its particular economic or political situation, or the level of civilization and culture it has been able to achieve. The persons in the original position have no information as to which generation they belong.

There are infinitely many variations of the initial situation and therefore no doubt indefinitely many theorems of moral geometry.

The circumstances of justice may be described as the normal conditions under which human cooperation is both possible and necessary.

First of all, principles should be general. That is, it must be possible to formulate them without use of what would be intuitively recognized as proper names, or rigged definite descriptions.

The claims of existing social arrangements and of self interest have been duly allowed for. We cannot at the end count them a second time because we do not like the result.

In all sectors of society there should be roughly equal prospects of culture and achievement for everyone similarly motivated and endowed. The expectations of those with the same abilities and aspirations should not be affected by their social class.

The first statement of the two principles reads as follows. First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others. Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a)reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all.

Our concern is solely with the basic structure of society and its major institutions and therefore with the standard cases of social justice.

This is a long book, not only in pages.

I am particularly grateful to Nozick for his unfailing help and encouragement during the last stages.

Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought. A theory however elegant and economical must be rejected or revised if it is untrue; likewise laws and institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust. Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override. For this reason justice denies that the loss of freedom for some is made right by a greater good shared by others. It does not allow that the sacrifices imposed on a few are outweighed by the larger sum of advantages enjoyed by many. Therefore in a just society the liberties of equal citizenship are taken as settled; the rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests.

The concept of justice I take to be defined, then, by the role of its principles in assigning rights and duties and in defining the appropriate division of social advantages. A conception of justice is an interpretation of this role.

The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance.

Social and economic inequalities, for example inequalities of wealth and authority, are just only if they result in compensating benefits for everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged members of society.

It may be expedient but it is not just that some should have less in order that others may prosper.

A conception of justice cannot be deduced from self evident premises or conditions on principles; instead, its justification is a matter of the mutual support of many considerations, of everything fitted together into one coherent view.

Indeed, it is tempting to suppose that it is self evident that things should be so arranged so as to lead to the most good.

An individual who finds that he enjoys seeing others in positions of lesser liberty understands that he has no claim whatever to this enjoyment.

An intuitionist conception of justice is, one might say, but half a conception.

We may suppose that everyone has in himself the whole form of a moral conception.

Intuitionism is not constructive, perfectionism is unacceptable.

To each according to his threat advantage does not count as a principle of justice.

I have assumed throughout that the persons in the original position are rational.

Inequalities are permissible when they maximize, or at least all contribute to, the long term expectations of the least fortunate group in society.

Ideal legislators do not vote their interests.

A just system must generate its own support.

There is a divergence between private and social accounting that the market fails to register. One essential task of law and government is to institute the necessary conditions.